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Abstract
This paper makes explicit the links between preferences over lotteries on length
of life and intertemporal choice. It shows that the approach used by traditional life
cycle models to account for uncertain survival corresponds to a strong assumption of
risk neutrality with respect to length of life. Relaxing such an assumption leads us
to develop a more general formulation of lifetime utility in which time discounting is
directly related to preferences over length of life. In particular, it provides an expla-
nation for exponential and hyperbolic discounting which are found to result, in a ﬁrst
approximation, from constant and hyperbolic risk aversion with respect to length of
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11 Introduction
It has long been recognized by economists, and in particular by Fisher (1930), that uncer-
tainty about the length of life has to play a key role in determining the trade-oﬀ between
present and future consumption. However, there are simple theoretical arguments relating
mortality to time discounting that have remained unexplored.
Most life cycle models that account for uncertain survival follow the path of Yaari’s
(1965) seminal paper.1 According to Yaari, survival uncertainty can be simply incorporated
into life cycle models by weighting the utility derived from future consumption by survival
probabilities. In Yaari’s model, at any age a, remaining lifetime expected utility can then
be written as: Z +∞
a
sa(t)α(t − a)u(c(t))dt (1)
where u(c(t)) is the instant utility of consumption at age t and sa(t) the probability of
being alive at age t, conditional on being alive at age a. The function α(.), usually called
the “subjective discount function”, is presented in Yaari (1965) and in most papers on
intertemporal choice as an exogenous factor accounting for impatience, inherent in human
behavior and unrelated to survival uncertainty. This discount function is often assumed to
be exponential, as it is the only shape to lead to time-consistent preferences (Strotz 1956),
although more complex forms (e.g., hyperbolic) are now increasingly considered (Loewenstein
and Thaler, 1989, Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992, Laibson, 1997 and 1998, Harris and Laibson,
2001, Angeletos & al, 2001).
In this paper, I argue that using equation (1) as a formulation of expected lifetime utility
involves making strong implicit assumptions on preferences over lotteries on length of life,
including a risk neutrality assumption. I explore how survival uncertainty may aﬀect indi-
vidual behavior and, in particular, consumption smoothing, when we relax this assumption
of risk neutrality. To do so, I propose to proceed with the following exercise: consider indi-
viduals who, in the absence of uncertainty, would have simple and “nice” preferences (that
1Leung (1994) or Butler (2001) provide interesting recent examples.
2is additive and time-consistent preferences) and try to answer the following question: how
would such individuals behave in a world where length of life is uncertain?
Obviously, there are a multitude of possible answers to this question, as answers have
to depend on individuals’ attitude toward risk. However, we shall see that assuming pref-
erences to be history independent and time-consistent implies that individuals are either
risk neutral with respect to length of life (in a sense that will be deﬁned later) and have
additive preferences or have a constant non-zero risk aversion with respect to life years and
non-additive preferences. The former case corresponds to Yaari’s model. The latter can be
seen as an extension of this model obtained by relaxing the assumption of risk neutrality
with respect to life duration. Although it is more complicated, especially since it is no longer
additive, it is far from being intractable and is worthy of exploration. In particular, I show
that in the case of an exogenous mortality pattern, preferences in this more general model
are represented by recursive utility functions that can be interpreted as extensions of the
classical Yaari utility function (equation 1) where the discount function is endogenous. I
also show that when considering the limit case where length of life is much more valued than
consumption, preferences can be approximated by an additive utility function with a speciﬁc
discount function related to mortality and preferences over length of life. Thus, even if we
were only interested in the simple additive case, this detour through the more general case
would be worthwhile as it provides a rationale for the subjective discount factor.
The interest of developing a general framework which includes preferences that do not
exhibit risk neutrality with respect to length of life can be further emphasized by considering
situations where preferences over lotteries on length of life are not necessarily time-consistent.
In particular, I explore the case where risk aversion with respect to the end of life increases
as death becomes closer in the future. Such a case can be easily formalized by assuming
decreasing absolute risk aversion with respect to length of life, instead of the constant risk
aversion property that characterized the time-consistent case. Analysis of intertemporal
choice under exogenous mortality can then be developed in a similar way and provides
interesting insights. In particular, I show that hyperbolic discounting can be seen, in a ﬁrst
3approximation, as a consequence of hyperbolic absolute risk aversion with respect to length
of life.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I present the main assumptions. In
the third section, I introduce the notion of risk aversion with respect to length of life. The
fourth section covers in detail the time-consistent case, while time-inconsistent preferences
will be discussed in the ﬁfth section. The main ﬁndings of the paper, as well as paths for
future research, are discussed in the concluding section.
2 Main assumptions
For an individual of age a what happened before age a belongs to history and cannot be a
matter of choice. Individuals care about their lives in the future. We assume that, for an
individual of age a, a life in the future is a bounded and continuous consumption proﬁle c
∈ CB([a,+∞[,R+) and an age at death t ∈ [a,+∞[. The set of possible lives in the future
of an individual of age a is denoted La and equals the product space:
La = CB([a,+∞[,R
+) × [a,+∞[
Such a formulation does not constrain the consumption after death to equal zero. That may
seem odd at ﬁrst sight, but that is of no consequence since I will assume that individuals do
not care for consumption after death. An element of La will be typically denoted (c,T).T h e
set CB([a,+∞[,R+) is endowed with the sup norm and [a,+∞[ with the Euclidean norm.
The set La, which is the product of two normed spaces, is endowed with the sup norm.
The discussion will bear on choice under uncertainty. That means that I will consider
preferences over MLa, the set of probability measures on the Borel σ−algebra of La. The set
of degenerated measures will be denoted Md
La.A ne l e m e n to fMd
La will be typically denoted
δ(c,T). For any two measures a ∈ MCB([a,+∞[,R+) and b ∈ M[a,+∞[ t h ep r o d u c tm e a s u r ei nMLa
will be denoted a × b.
In order to stress the role of uncertainty about the length of life, I will limit the study
4to individuals who would have very standard preferences in the absence of uncertainty, so
that identifying the consequences of uncertain lifetime will be straightforward. In short, I
will only consider “well-behaved individuals” deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 Throughout the paper, the terms “well-behaved individuals” will refer to indi-
viduals for whom:
1. Ageing is a smooth process that does not engender any kind of discontinuity in terms
of preferences.
2. At any age, preferences over MLa (denoted by Âa) are independent of past consumption
and admit an expected utility representation with a smooth Bernoulli utility function
Ua.





such that for any two m1, m2 ∈ MLa





3. At any age a, preferences over the set of degenerate lotteries, Md
La, can be represented






where u(.) is a smooth positive increasing function and α, the rate of discount, is a
constant.
Such a deﬁnition implies that, in the absence of uncertainty, a “well-behaved individual”
would have additive preferences. He would also have time-consistent preferences with re-
spect to both the choice of consumption path and the trade-oﬀ b e t w e e nl e n g t ho fl i f ea n d
5consumption. The positivity of the function u also implies that whatever consumption level
is proposed, longer life increases individual utility.
3 Risk aversion with respect to length of life
For any age a the Bernoulli utility function Ua must lead to the same preferences as the
function Va when we consider degenerate lotteries. This implies that the Bernoulli utility
function Ua must be obtained by an increasing transformation from Va, or from e−αaVa,s i n c e
the functions Va and e−αaVa obviously represent the same preferences.2 The transformation
that leads from e−αaVa to Ua may depend on all that characterizes an individual of age a:
his age and his past consumption. However, as we assumed that preferences at age a are
independent of past consumption (point 2 in Deﬁnition 1), we can assume without loss of
generality that this transformation only depends on a. Denoting this transformation by








where f(x,a) is an increasing function in x for every a. The regularity assumptions included
in the ﬁrst two points of Deﬁnition 1 allow one to assume that f is a smooth function.
In Yaari (1965), the function f was implicitly assumed to be linear in x,s i n c eY a a r i
considered equation (2) as the “most natural” form of Bernoulli lifetime utility functions
(Yaari, 1965, p 137). In this paper, I will allow the function f to take more complex forms.
The problem then involves deducing what the reasonable candidates for the function f(x,a)
are from economic arguments.
Some intuition can be provided by considering the imaginary case of an individual who
has an exogenous consumption proﬁle but can choose between several mortality patterns.
It is clear that such simple choices are not observed in reality since, in general, individuals
choose at the same time between diﬀerent mortality patterns and diﬀerent consumption
proﬁles. However, the case of an exogenous consumption proﬁle can be viewed as a thought
2For a given a, the factor e−αa is just a positive constant that does not aﬀect preferences.
6experiment that will provide some insights on the meaning of the function f (preferences
allowing choices involving diﬀerent consumption proﬁles to be modeled will be considered
in the remaining sections). The consumption proﬁle being ﬁxed, preferences simply involve
comparing diﬀerent lotteries on the length of life, a one-dimensional variable. This is similar
to preferences over monetary lotteries, for which the theory is well developed. In particular,
all the information can be summarized by local measures of risk aversion:
Deﬁnition 2 For any consumption proﬁle, c,a n da n ya g e ,a,w ed e ﬁn et h er i s ka v e r s i o n







This measure of risk aversion is clearly analogous to the Arrow-Pratt coeﬃcient of ab-
solute risk aversion that is found in any economic textbook that deals with the case of
preferences over monetary lotteries. The only diﬀerence is that the variable of interest is no
longer wealth, but life duratio n . A sw i t ht h eA r r o w - P r a t tc o e ﬃcient, this measure of risk
aversion can be used to compute the certainty equivalents (measured in life years) of lotteries
on life duration.
Without making further assumptions, we can discuss some properties of this risk aversion















where fx and fxx denote the ﬁrst and the second derivatives of the function f(x,a) with
respect to x.
We can see, that whatever the properties of the function f(x,a), well-behaved individuals
7will have a risk aversion with respect to age at death that will depend on the consumption
proﬁle considered. This makes sense, since rational individuals value the risks on age at death
according to the pleasures to be enjoyed in the event of survival. In particular, there is no
function f which ensures some positive risk aversion for any consumption proﬁle and, more
generally, it would be diﬃcult to ﬁnd interesting properties for risk aversion with respect to
age at death that hold for any consumption proﬁle.
We could however easily deﬁne some general properties if we restrict ourselves to con-
sumption proﬁles such that v(t)=e−αtu(c(t)) is constant.
Deﬁnition 3 We call “constant ﬂow of satisfaction consumption proﬁle” any consumption
proﬁle such that e−αtu(c(t)) is independent of t.
Note that, although the above deﬁnition makes use of the function u and the scalar α,t h e
concept of “constant ﬂow of satisfaction consumption proﬁle” is a well-deﬁned ordinal notion,
related to individuals’ preferences on Md
La, but independent of the particular representation
of preferences which was chosen. In fact, one may deﬁne the “marginal rate of substitution
between length of life and consumption at time zero” by 1
²1 times the amount of instant
consumption that an individual is willing to give up between time 0 and 0+²2 in order to
live T +²1²2 years, instead of T years, when ²1 and ²2 are inﬁnitesimally small. This marginal
rate of substitution is unambiguously an aspect of individuals’ preferences on Md
La,u n r e l a t e d
to the choice of a particular representation of preferences. It is then straightforward to check
that the “constant ﬂow of satisfaction consumption proﬁles” are the consumption proﬁles
such that the marginal rate of substitution between length of life and consumption at time
zero is independent of the length of life. Stated otherwise, constant ﬂow of satisfaction
consumption proﬁles are consumption proﬁles for which any additional lapse of life of is seen
as bringing the same quantity of pleasures.
The notion of constant ﬂow of satisfaction consumption proﬁle allows us to circumvent
the consequences of variations in the quality of life and makes it possible to deﬁne a concept
of risk aversion with respect to life years as follows:
8Deﬁnition 4 A well-behaved individual will be said to exhibit risk neutrality (respectively:
positive risk aversion /constant absolute risk aversion / decreasing absolute risk aversion /
hyperbolic absolute risk aversion ) with respect to length of life if, for any constant ﬂow of
consumption proﬁle, and any current age, he exhibits risk neutrality (respectively: positive
risk aversion /constant absolute risk aversion / decreasing absolute risk aversion / hyperbolic
absolute risk aversion ) with respect to age at death.
It is appropriate to stress that these are qualitative properties which describe what kind
of risk aversion would characterize preferences over lotteries on length of life if the quality
of life was ﬂat. If such properties can be independent of the level of quality of life, the
degree of risk aversion will depend on this level, as shown in equation (4). Thus, in general,
it is impossible to deﬁne a degree of risk aversion with respect to life duration which is
independent of the quality of life. To avoid potential confusion between qualitative and
quantitative properties for risk aversion, I will systematically use the terms “risk aversion
with respect to age at death” to refer to quantitative properties deﬁned conditionally on a
consumption proﬁle (Deﬁnition 2) and “risk aversion with respect to length of life” to refer
to qualitative properties that hold for any constant ﬂow of satisfaction consumption proﬁle
(Deﬁnition 4).
From equation (4) the link between the function f and the notion of risk aversion with
respect to length of life is immediate:
Proposition 1 An individual of age a is risk neutral (respectively: risk averse/risk prone)
with respect to length of life if and only if f is linear (respectively: concave/convex) in x.
The concavity of f with respect to its ﬁrst argument can therefore be interpreted in terms
of risk aversion with respect to length of life. It is then clear that Yaari’s formulation, which
assumes that f is linear, involves assuming risk neutrality with respect to length of life. The
remainder of the paper explains how the theory can be extended when such an assumption
is relaxed.
94 The case of time-consistent preferences
In this section I ﬁrst show that assuming individuals to be time-consistent leads to restricting
the study to particular speciﬁcations for f.S t i l lf does not need to be linear and we obtain
a more general representation of preferences than the one used by Yaari. I then discuss the
consequences for intertemporal choices under uncertain lifetime.
4.1 Time-consistent agents
The notion of time-consistency that I use in this paper is standard. An agent is time-
consistent if he does not exhibit preference reversals, which could make him change his plans
as he gets older, in the absence of any new information. In order to formally state this
non-reversal preference property we shall need a few technical deﬁnitions.
For any a<band a measure µa ∈ MLa, I will say that µa is degenerate till b,w i t h
intermediate consumption c0 ∈ C([a,b],R+) if
µa ({(c,T)|T ≥ b and c(t)=c0(t) for all t ∈ [a,b]})=1
According to such a probability measure there is no chance of dying before age b and con-
sumption between age a and b equals c0 with probability one.
For any µa ∈ MLa that is degenerate till age b with intermediate consumption c0 we
deﬁne a corresponding measure µb ∈ MLb in the following way. For any measurable subset
B of Lb we ﬁrst deﬁne A(B) ⊂ La by:
A(B)={(c,T) ∈ La|(c,T) ∈ B and c(t)=c0(t) for all t ∈ [a,b]}
a n dt h e nd e ﬁne µb(B) by µb(B)=µa(A(B)). The measure µb describes what may happen
after age b to an individual whose future is described by the probability measure µa.
Deﬁnition 5 An agent is time-consistent if there do not exist two ages a<b ,ac o n s u m p t i o n
proﬁle c0 ∈ C([a,b],R+) and two measures µ1
a,µ 2
a ∈ MLa such that:
101. µ1
a and µ2




3. The corresponding measures µ1
band µ2
b do not satisfy µ1
b Âb µ2
b.
The following result shows that preferences of time-consistent agents have a simple rep-
resentation:
Theorem 1 Well-behaved individuals (Deﬁnition 1) have time-consistent preferences if and
only if there exists a constant k such that at any age, a, the relation of preferences Âaadmits













a u(c(t))e−α(t−a)dt if k =0
(5)
Proof. See Appendix A.
An immediate consequence of Theorem 1 is:
Corollary 1 Well-behaved individuals that have time-consistent preferences exhibit constant
absolute risk aversion with respect to length of life.
Proof. For any constant ﬂow of satisfaction consumption proﬁle let us note ν(c)=
e−αtu(c(t)) which, by deﬁnition, is independent of t. For any a and T we have:
Ua(c,T)=eαa
k (1 − e−k(T−a)ν(c)) if k 6=0
Ua(c,T)=( T − a)ν(c) if k =0








so that the risk aversion with respect to age at death is independent of the age at death.
11Intuitively this last result comes from the simple fact that as one gets older and closer
to death the quantity of remaining life decreases. Thus any risk aversion which depends on
the quantity of remaining life years will lead to inconsistent behavior.
The constant k in the utility function (5) is simply related to risk aversion with respect
to length of life. If k =0 , then individuals are risk neutral with respect to length of life. If
k>0 then preferences exhibit positive risk aversion, while if k<0 preferences exhibit risk
proneness. For a given constant ﬂow of satisfaction consumption proﬁle, the larger k,t h e
stronger will be risk aversion with respect to age at death.
Also, we see from equation (6) that for a given positive k, the higher the quality of life,
the greater risk aversion with respect to age at death. This less intuitive result expresses the
fact that a life with little pleasure is closer to death, in terms of utility, than a life with a high
level of pleasure. However such a result should not be overly stressed since it is likely that
diﬀerences between high and low levels of consumption are, in terms of welfare, relatively
insigniﬁcant as compared with the diﬀerence between life and death. Hence, it may be the
case that, in reality, risk aversion with respect to age at death is only weakly related to the
consumption level.
4.2 Intertemporal choice under exogenous mortality
The constant k that appears in the utility function (5) has been related to the notion of
risk aversion with respect to length of life. Thus, it clearly matters for mortality choices. In
this section, we will see that even when mortality is exogenous (so that individuals can only
choose between lotteries on consumption proﬁles) this constant k is still a key parameter for
modeling intertemporal choice.
Throughout this section, as in Section 4.3, mortality is assumed to be exogenous. The
mortality pattern, µ, is described by an age-speciﬁc hazard rate of death µ(t). It is assumed
that µ(t) → +∞ when t → +∞.
For any age a the survival function at age t (the probability of being alive at age t
12conditional on being alive at age a)i sg i v e nb y :




We denote by mµ,a the probability measure on [a,+∞[ deﬁned by
mµ,a([t1,t 2]) = sa(t1) − sa(t2) for a ≤ t1 ≤ t2
mµ,a([t1,t 2]) gives the probability that death occurs between age t1 and t2, knowing that the
individual was alive at age a.
Theorem 2 Consider a time-consistent well-behaved individual (Deﬁnition 1) who faces an
exogenous mortality pattern µ.D e ﬁne Âµ,a the relation of preferences on MCB([a,+∞[,R+) by:
ν Âµ,a λ ⇔ (ν × mµ,a) Âa (λ × mµ,a)
The relation of preferences Âµ,aadmits an expected utility representation with a Bernoulli














Proof. See Appendix B.
The utility function (7) can be seen to be a time-consistent generalization of Yaari’s utility
function (1), which is obtained when k =0 . Although agents cannot choose their mortality
(mortality being exogenous), the presence of the constant k in equation (7) implies that
risk aversion with respect to length of life has an impact on preferences over consumption
proﬁles. The intuition is that even if there is no control on the lottery on length of life,
intertemporal reallocation of consumption can be used to modify the distribution of lifetime
utility outcomes.
Further analysis of the role of the constant k in equation (7) provides additional insights.
13Compared to the case k =0 , considering a non-zero k leads us to introduce an endogenous
discount function in the lifetime utility function. When k>0, the speed at which this
discount function decreases is positively associated with both k and the level of consumption.
Also, as noted in Section 4.1, when k is positive, risk aversion with respect to age at death
increases with both k and the level of consumption. Intuitively, what equation (7) says is
that instant utility should be discounted according to some factor related to risk aversion
with respect to age of death. The mechanisms at play then become pretty clear:
1. Risk averse individuals tend to consume earlier in the life cycle to avoid the partic-
ularly bad outcomes which would result from having a short life with a low level of
consumption.3
2. Risk aversion with respect to age at death increases with the quality of life.
One interesting ﬁnding is that, when individuals are risk averse (that is when k>0),
the rate of discount increases with consumption, so that rich people would appear to be
more impatient than poor people. One may ﬁnd this rather surprising. In particular, it is
in contradiction with the assumption made in Becker and Mulligan (1997). However, note
that the results we provide hold for a given exogenous mortality pattern. But in reality,
rich people tend to have lower mortality rates than poor people and, if we included this
fact in our framework, we might obtain results consistent with the Becker and Mulligan
assumption.4 In fact, the eﬀect of consumption level on the rate of discount is likely to be
weak, and therefore dominated by the eﬀects of diﬀerential mortality. Indeed, as discussed
at the end of the Section 4.1, if the diﬀerence between life and death is much greater than
the diﬀerence between high and low levels of consumption, consumption may have only a
3When the lottery on length of life is exogenous, the timing of consumption still allows one to manipulate
the distribution of lifetime utility outcomes. Short lives tend to correspond to low levels of lifetime utility.
However privileging early consumption is a way to make this eﬀect smaller and to make the distribution of
lifetime utility outcomes less unequal.
4See Bommier (2005a) for a discussion on the non-trivial relation between diﬀerential mortality and time
discounting.
14minor impact on instant utility5 and therefore on risk aversion with respect to age at death.
Precisely, such a limit case is developed in the following subsection.
4.3 Additive preferences as the limit of a priceless life
Compared with Yaari’s formulation, the utility function (7) has an undisputable drawback:
it is not linear. In practice, this is a source of technical complications and we may wonder
whether there exist linear approximations that can be used. An obvious possibility, we
know, is to assume that k ' 0, which provides Yaari’s standard formulation. But there is
another possibility, that does not assume k to be small and provides diﬀerent insights on
the origin of time discounting. This involves considering the limit case where life is much
more valued than any conceivable gains in consumption but where, for technological reasons,
people cannot trade consumption for longer life.
To formalize this point I deﬁn et h e“ p r i c e l e s sl i f ec o n t e x t ”a sf o l l o w s :
Deﬁnition 6 The ”priceless life context” corresponds to a situation where:
1. mortality is exogenous,
2. the instant utility u(c(t)) can be written:
u(c(t)) = 1 + λw(c(t))
where w is bounded (at least over the set of feasible consumption paths) and λ is a
(small) scalar,
3. well-behaved individuals have no pure time preference (α =0 )
Remark that the last assumption is not absolutely necessary for what follows. It is made
to emphasize the fact that, even if individuals have no pure time preferences, risk aversion
5The formulation of lifetime utility chosen in Deﬁnition 1 implicitly assumes that instant utility has been
normalized in such a way that the instant utility in the death state is zero.
15with respect to length of life leads them to discount future consumption in a non-trivial way,
as soon as the length of life is uncertain.
The game now involves analyzing cases where λ is very small. The smaller λ,t h em o r e
people would prefer to have a longer life even if it results in lower levels of consumption. When
λ tends to zero, rational individuals would be ready to give up most of their consumption
to live longer. However, I assume that they cannot do so in the “priceless life context”
because the technology to transform wealth into longer life is unavailable (mortality being
exogenous).
Considering the cases where λ is small, an expansion of the exponential function provides
an approximation of the lifetime utility given by equation (7). Keeping only the terms of















For any a,t h eﬁrst term,
R +∞
a sa(t)ek(t−a)dt, is a constant that has no consequences for
preferences over consumption proﬁles. Switching the order of integration in the third term,
















Integrating by parts the term in brackets leads to the following result:
Theorem 3 In the limit λ → 0 of the “priceless life context”, at any age a, preferences over
MCB([a,+∞[,R+) of time-consistent well-behaved individuals admits an expected utility repre-




sa(t)αa(t − a)w(c(t))dt (8)










Henceforth, I refer to this function αa(.) as the “CARA aversion for early death (CARA-
AED) discount function” 6.
The Bernoulli utility function (8) is very much similar to the one suggested by Yaari
(equation (1)). The main diﬀerence is that the discount function is now related to mortality
risks and risk aversion with respect to length of life. Theorem 3 therefore provides a rationale
for introducing a discount function, even in the absence of pure time preferences.
The properties of the CARA-AED discount function can be readily related to mortality
and to preferences with respect to length of life. First, if people are risk neutral with respect
to length of life (k =0 ), then this discount function is constant and can be ignored. Second,
if people are risk averse with respect to length of life (k>0), then this discount function
is decreasing and leads the individual to place relatively less weight on consumption which
is further in the future, as it is most often assumed. However, as explained in Section 4.2,
rather than pure impatience, this function expresses the fact that risk averse individuals
should consume early in the life cycle to avoid the particularly low levels of lifetime utility
that would result from having a short life with little instantaneous pleasures.








where µ(τ +a) is the hazard rate of death at age τ +a. In particular, if the risk of mortality
were nil during a certain period of life, this discount function would be constant over the
same period. This result should be rather intuitive since risk aversion with respect to age at
death should not play a role in a period of zero mortality. Also, if the hazard rate of death
6The term CARA is introduced here because time-consistent individuals have a constant absolute risk
aversion with respect to length of life (Corollary 1).
17were constant, then this discount function would be exponential, with a rate of discount
equaling k,t h ec o e ﬃcient of absolute risk aversion with respect to length of life.7
However, demographic studies indicate that the hazard rate of death is not constant.
After age 40, it increases approximately exponentially, at a rate which lies between 8 and 9
percent a year. But, if the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion with respect to length of life
is somewhat greater than 0.09 per year, then the approximation which involves assuming
that the hazard rate of death is constant may be reasonable. In such a case, risk aver-
sion with respect to length of life can justify the use of exponential discounting, as a ﬁrst
approximation.
Out of this approximation, it is straightforward to numerically compute and graph the
CARA-AED discount function from empirical mortality data (Figure 1a). In the example
drawn, which corresponds to a constant absolute risk aversion of 0.10 per year, we ﬁnd that
the CARA-AED discount function is well-approximated by an exponential function although
the plot of the rate of discount,
− ∂
∂ταa(τ)
αa(τ) , shows that the ﬁti sn o tp e r f e c t( F i g u r e1 c ) .
Lastly, we note that the fact that the CARA-AED discount function is not exponential is
not necessarily a source of time-inconsistency since the discount function changes with age.
In fact, time-inconsistencies only arise if the rate of discount at a given age changes with the
individual’s current age. When an individual is a years old, the rate of discount at a future
age a1,w h i c hi sa1 − a y e a r si nt h ef u t u r e ,i sg i v e nb y
− ∂
∂ταa(τ)
















The right hand side term is clearly independent of a, implying that the CARA-AED discount
function does indeed lead to time-consistent behavior.
7In the limit λ → 0,t h ec o e ﬃcient of absolute risk aversion with respect to age at death does not depend
on consumption and equals k. It makes sense, therefore, to speak of a level of risk aversion with respect to
life duration, without specifying a consumption level.
185 Time-inconsistent preferences
From Theorem 1, we know that well-behaved individuals are time-inconsistent when the
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for some x and a). The latter case is less interesting from an economic point of view. It occurs
when, for psychological reasons, individual preferences change with age. It can clearly lead to
time-inconsistency but it does not provide convincing insights on the fundamental underlying












6=0 .T h e r e
a r et h e nn op u r ea g ee ﬀects on individual preferences but risk aversion with respect to length
o fl i f ei sn o tc o n s t a n t .
Let us therefore assume that f is independent of a:
f(x,a)=φ(x)
with, for the moment, no other assumption than φ
0 > 0.8 Working along the lines of Section
4.2 we ﬁnd, that at age a, preferences over consumption paths conditional on a mortality















where sa(t) is the probability of being alive at age t conditional on being alive at age a.
The limit case where life is much more valued that any feasible gain in consumption can
be developed as in Section 4.3. In the limit λ → 0 of the “priceless life context” (Deﬁnition












=0and fx > 0 implies that f(x,a) is of the form g1(a)φ(x)+g2(a)
with g1(a)φ
0(x) > 0. Since a positive transformation of utility does not aﬀect preferences, it can be assumed
without loss of generality that g1(a)=1 , g2(a)=0and φ
0 > 0.
























which shows that it would be constant during a period of zero mortality.
Similar to (10) we can give the expression of the rate of discount at a future age a1 of an




















Now, remark that if
−φ00(x)
φ0(x) is a decreasing function then the fraction
φ0(τ1−a)
φ0(a1−a) is decreasing
in a (for a<a 1 < τ1). Thus, it appears that decreasing risk aversion with respect to length
of life implies that the rate of discount at age a1 increases with the current age. This is
fairly intuitive: as explained after Theorem 2, when lifetime is uncertain, risk aversion with
respect to age at death creates an incentive to consume earlier in the life cycle. Under
the assumption of decreasing risk aversion with respect to length of life, risk aversion with
respect to age at death a1 increases when getting closer to age a1 (the stock of remaining life
decreases). Thus the incentive to consume earlier intensiﬁes when approaching age a1 and
the rate of discount at age a1 increases when getting closer to that age.
The symmetric pattern is obtained if we assume increasing risk aversion with respect to
length of life.
Interestingly, decreasing risk aversion with respect to length of life generates a pattern
of time discounting that shares some similarity with the pattern assumed by standard hy-
20perbolic discounting models.9 T h er a t eo ft i m ed i s c o u n t i n ga tag i v e na g ei n c r e a s e sw h e n
getting closer to that age. To explore this similarity further, I considered the particular case









with η ≥ 0 and γ > 0. I then numerically computed the discount function αφ
a (called
thereafter the HARA-AED discount function) of a 40 year old man when using realistic
mortality patterns. The parameters γ =2 .5 and η =0 .04 were chosen so that the rate of
discount is about 13% in the short term and 3% after 15 years. Figures 1b and 1d show that
the HARA-AED discount function is well-approximated by generalized hyperbolas and that
the rate of discount is reasonably close to what is predicted by hyperbolic discounting.
We ﬁnd therefore that hyperbolic discounting can actually arise from two diﬀerent kinds
of assumptions. A ﬁrst possibility, followed by the standard literature on hyperbolic dis-
counting, is to assume that individuals are risk neutral with respect to length of life and
have an exogenous discount function which is a generalized hyperbola. The other possibil-
ity involves assuming that individuals have no pure time preferences but a hyperbolic risk
aversion with respect to length of life.11
Although these two approaches lead to very similar patterns of time discounting, they are
of diﬀerent nature. The standard additive model with hyperbolic discounting assumes that
ordinal preferences are time-inconsistent. In the approach I followed, ordinal preferences are
time-consistent. Inconsistencies exclusively arise from the way individuals account for un-
certainty, and in particular for uncertain lifetime. The two approaches therefore correspond
9Models that assume preferences to be additive and the subjective discount function to be a generalized
hyperbola: φ(t)=( 1+αt)−
β
a with α,β > 0. Such discount functions were introduced in Harvey (1986) and
axiomatized by Prelec (1989). See also the discussion in Loewestein and Prelec (1992).
10Well-behaved individuals then have hyperbolic absolute risk aversion with respect to length of life (De-
ﬁnition 4).
11Halevy (2004) suggests another way to obtain time-inconsistent preferences with diminishing impatience.
The idea is to apply Yaari’s dual theory (Yaari, 1987) to the case of intertemporal choice under uncertain
lifetime.
21to fundamentally diﬀerent assumptions on human rationality. Moreover, the contrast is not
purely theoretical. Even though both approaches may have similar predictions for intertem-
poral choice under an exogenous mortality pattern, they sharply diverge when considering
mortality changes.12
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper explored the consequences of uncertain lifetime on individuals’ behavior and in
particular on intertemporal choice theory. I showed that Yaari’s additive utility function,
which is the standard way to incorporate uncertain lifetime into life cycle models, corresponds
to a strong assumption on risk neutrality with respect to length of life. I explored how one
could relax this assumption of risk neutrality without introducing time-inconsistencies in
individual preferences. This leads us to consider non-additive preferences that exhibit a
constant absolute risk aversion with respect to length of life.
Relaxing the risk neutrality assumption is costly in the sense that it forces us to consider
non-additive utility functions. Nonetheless, additivity can be recovered, as a ﬁrst approxi-
mation, when considering the limit in which individuals would be willing to trade most of
their consumption for a longer life but cannot do so for technological reasons. Consider-
ing additivity as resulting from such a limit, rather than resulting from a risk neutrality
assumption, gives interesting insights on the origin and the structure of the subjective dis-
count functions considered in life cycle models. I explained how such discount functions are
related to mortality and preferences over lotteries on length of life and I discussed why they
may be quite close to exponential discounting when individuals have a constant absolute risk
aversion with respect to length of life.
Lastly, this paper brieﬂy discussed the case of time-inconsistent preferences. I explained
why decreasing risk aversion with respect to length of life generates inconsistent patterns of
time discounting, with rates of discount at a given age that increase when approaching that
12See the discussion in Bommier (2005a).
22age. In particular, hyperbolic risk aversion with respect to length of life was shown to lead,
in a ﬁrst approximation, to hyperbolic discounting. What has sometimes been presented as
an anomaly in intertemporal choice theory may therefore result from a common assumption
on risk aversion applied to the less usual domain of studies that are preferences over lotteries
on length of life.
This paper suggests various extensions. First, by making the link between time discount-
ing and risk aversion, it opens the route for a life cycle theory where impatience exclusively
results from the combination of risk aversion and uncertainty. Such a theory would not be
subject to the severe criticisms of Pigou (1920) and Ramsey (1928) that respectively consid-
ered time preferences as “wholly irrational” or arising from the “weakness of imagination”.
Human impatience may be driven by risk aversion, a less controversial concept. Second, it
suggests that the relation between mortality and impatience may be much stronger than
assumed in Yaari’s model. This is of crucial importance when discussing the economic im-
pact of mortality changes. Last, it calls for an economic analysis of endogenous mortality
choices that accounts for risk aversion with respect to length of life. These diﬀerent points
are developed in Bommier (2005a, 2005b) and Bommier and Villeneuve (2004).
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25APPENDIX
AP r o o f o f T h e o r e m 1
Let us ﬁrst show the following result:
Lemma 1 Assume time-consistency (Deﬁnition 5). Then for any consumption proﬁle, risk
aversion with respect to age at death is independent of current age.
Proof. Consider a given consumption proﬁle c ∈ CB([0,+∞[,R+), and three ages a<
b<e T.W i t ha no b v i o u sa b u s eo fn o t a t i o nt h er e s t r i c t i o no fc on [a,+∞[, [b,+∞[ or on [a,b]
will be denoted by the same letter c.
Let us show that the assumption of time-consistency implies that:
RALa(c, e T)=RALb(c, e T)
For any (small) positive ε, deﬁn et h r e es i m p l em e a s u r e sµa, m1
a(ε) and m2
a(ε) in MLa by:





















for i =1 ,2. Using Taylor expansions, one has:
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∂T (c,e T) , the ﬁrst and third terms of the right hand














which implies that for ε small enough:
m
2
a(ε) Âa µa Âa m
1
a(ε)
The measures µa, m1
a(ε) and m2
a(ε) are degenerate till age b with intermediate consumption
c. The corresponding measures µb, m1
b(ε) and m2
b(ε) in MLb have exactly the same expression
as µa, m1
a(ε) and m2
a(ε) (see equation (12)) with the diﬀerence that the letter c then denotes
the restriction of c on [b,+∞[.
The assumption of time-consistency implies that for ε small enough we must also have
m
2
b(ε) Âb µb Âb m
1
b(ε) (13)























27which implies that (13) can hold only if RALa(c, e T)=RALb(c, e T)
We can now prove Theorem 1. From Lemma 1 if individuals are time-consistent it must




for any consumption proﬁle and for any a<T.

































a u(c(t))e−αtdt and v(a)=u(c(a))e−αa. This clearly holds for any consumption















or, equivalently, if and only if:
x → f(x,a)
correspond to constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility functions, with a degree of risk
aversion independent of a.
Since a positive linear transformation of a Bernoulli utility function leaves preferences
unchanged, we can assume without loss of generality that:
f(x,a)=eαa(1−e−kx
k ) for some k 6=0
or
f(x,a)=eαax
28We then obtain the Bernoulli utility function (5).
Now it remains to be shown that preferences represented by (5) are time-consistent. Con-
sider two measures µ1
a,µ 2
a ∈ MLa that are degenerate till b, with intermediate consumption
c0.D e n o t eµ1
b and µ2













































and preference reversals cannot occur.
B Proof of Theorem 2
By deﬁnition of the expected utility representation:
(ν × mµ,a) Âa (λ × mµ,a) ⇔
Z


































=0and Ua(c,a)=0 .T h e































Therefore, the relation of preferences Âµ,aadmits an expected utility representation with
Bernoulli utility function Uµ,a.
30Figure 1: Properties of the AED discount functions for a 40 year old man







































Figure 1a: CARA−AED discount function







































Figure 1b: HARA−AED discount function


































CARA−AED rate of discount
Exponential discounting
Figure 1c: CARA−AED rate of discount


































HARA−AED rate of discount
Hyperbolic discounting
Figure 1d: HARA−AED rate of discount
Notes :
1. Figure 1a: CARA-AED discount function computed from equation (8) with a constant absolute risk aversion equalling 0.1 per year (k =0 .1).
Fitted with an exponential function (y = e−0.041∗x).
2. Figure 1b: HARA-AED discount function computed from equation (10) with φ(x)=−(0.4+ x
2.5)−1.5. Fitted with a generalized hyperbola
(y =( 1+0 .24 ∗ x)− 0.13
0.24 ).
3. Figure 1c: CARA-AED rate of discount,
− d
dτ α40(τ)
α40(τ) , computed with the same parameters as for Figure 1a. The dotted line equation is
y =0 .041.








, computed with the same parameters as for Figure 1b. The dotted line equation is
y = 0.13
1+0.24∗x.
5. Computations are based on 1995 US mortality data, obtained from the Berkeley Mortality Database and originally issued by the Oﬃce of
the Actuary of the Social Security Administration.